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This commentary summarizes the authors’ main points of agreement 
and disagreement with respect to the proposal written by Dr. Hetzel. The
authors agree with Dr. Hetzel’s proposal on four points: after a central
bank has lowered the interest rate to zero, (1) a central bank is not in 
fact powerless to stop deflation; (2) it does not make sense to focus on the
quantity of the monetary base per se; (3) it is important to influence
market expectations if monetary policy is to be effective; and (4) central
bank solvency holds some importance. The authors disagree with 
Dr. Hetzel’s proposal on three points: (1) transmission channels of 
quantitative easing; (2) potential costs and benefits of his proposal; and
(3) the timing of introduction of an explicit nominal anchor.
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DO NOT REPRINT OR REPRODUCE WITHOUT PERMISSION.1. Governor Fukui argued that “even after short-term interest rates had reached the zero bound, the Bank did not
throw up its hands in defeat but rather continued to make efforts by providing ample liquidity and ‘borrowing’
from the effects of future monetary easing.” See Fukui (2003).
2. See Hetzel (2004, p. 2).
3. See Hetzel (2004, p. 15).
4. This also implies that it does not make sense to differentiate unsterilized intervention in foreign exchange markets
from sterilized intervention under zero nominal interest rates. This is because unsterilized intervention simply 
corresponds to sterilized intervention coupled with the provision of reserves through the purchase of short-term
government securities, a move that in itself has no effect.
I. Introduction
The Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies invited Dr. Hetzel as a visiting
scholar from September to November 2003. The purpose of this commentary is to
confirm points of agreement, as well as our reservations, with respect to the contents
of Dr. Hetzel’s proposal. 
II. Points of Agreement 
We will begin by summarizing some of the major points on which we agree with 
Dr. Hetzel.
First, from the point of view of monetarism, Dr. Hetzel emphasizes that a central
bank is not powerless to stop deflation after the bank has lowered the interest rate to
zero. We agree. Indeed, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) has been making every effort to
stop deflation by providing ample liquidity and influencing market expectations.
1 In
this sense, the BOJ’s view has nothing to do with what Dr. Hetzel calls the “liquidity
view,” that is, the view that “the central bank is impotent to end deflation after it has
lowered the interest rate to zero.”
2
Second, we agree with Dr. Hetzel when he states that “at a near-zero call rate, for
banks, current account balances (CABs) and short-term liquid debt instruments like
Treasury and financing bills are perfect substitutes.”
3 Specifically, it does not make
sense to focus on the quantity of the monetary base per se apart from other financial
assets that yield virtually zero interest rates.
4
It should be noted, however, that the “meaninglessness of focusing on the quantity
of the monetary base itself under zero interest rates” does not necessarily mean that
“quantitative easing is meaningless.” Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), in their classic
work in the economics of monetary policy, argue that their well-known result, called
the “irrelevance proposition” applicable to open market operations involving a variety
of assets that the central bank might acquire, holds under the assumption that 
open market operations do not change the expectations regarding the future course 
of conduct of monetary or fiscal policy. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) then argue
that open market operations should be viewed as largely ineffective to the extent that
these operations fail to change expectations regarding future policy; concluding that
quantitative easing is not necessarily futile, and that the central bank’s actions should
be determined with a view to signaling the nature of its policy commitments, and not
for the purpose of creating some sort of “direct effects.”
26 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 20045. See Reifschneider and Williams (2000), Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe (2001), and Eggertsson and Woodford
(2003) for detailed discussions on the policy commitment effect when a central bank faces the zero bound of 
nominal interest rates.
6. We analyze the mechanism of the so-called “policy duration effect” in Fujiki, Okina, and Shiratsuka (2001),
Fujiki and Shiratsuka (2002), and Okina and Shiratsuka (2004a).
7. See Ueda (2004). Ueda (2004) also sums up the experiences of insolvent central banks, and concludes that the
maintenance of a sound balance sheet is, in general, neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the 
fulfillment of a central bank’s responsibilities, but that there have been cases in which an unhealthy balance sheet
became a major obstacle to price stability. See also Fukui (2003).
Third, we share an understanding of the importance of credibility and expectations
in any effective monetary policy. In his concluding remarks, Dr. Hetzel refers to 
the change in direction of U.S. monetary policy under then Federal Reserve Board
(FRB) Chairman Paul Volcker and emphasizes the importance of establishing the 
credibility of the central bank. We fully agree with the importance of influencing 
market expectations, especially under zero interest rates, as a central bank has no 
reliable policy instruments other than its influence on market expectations. While 
Dr. Hetzel does not mention the irrelevance proposition of Eggertsson and Woodford
(2003), we are sympathetic with their argument. 
Even when short-term interest rates have declined to virtually zero, a central bank
can produce further easing effects by a policy commitment.
5 A central bank can
influence market expectations by making an explicit commitment to the length of
time it will hold short-term interest rates at virtually zero. If the bank succeeds in
credibly extending the duration of this commitment, it can then reduce long-term
interest rates and stabilize the yield curve as a whole.
6
Fourth, to a certain extent we also share a common perception of the role of central
bank solvency. Dr. Hetzel argues that maintenance of solvency is an institutional 
safeguard to protect the central bank’s independence, and that a central bank needs this
protection against political pressure to use its seigniorage revenues to buy the debt 
of insolvent firms and banks. This argument echoes the view of BOJ Policy Board
member Kazuo Ueda, who says “political-economic constraints in the real world may
prevent central banks from fulfilling their responsibility to maintain price stability, 
if the central bank’s financial strength deteriorates substantially.”
7
III. Some Reservations concerning Dr. Hetzel’s Arguments
Next, we will discuss some reservations concerning Dr. Hetzel’s arguments. Based on the
quantity theory view, Dr. Hetzel proposes a quantitative strategy for stabilizing the price
level, a strategy that renders the monetary base dependent on nominal variables such as
money growth and nominal output. The BOJ Desk would exchange all short-term, 
liquid assets in its portfolio for illiquid assets like 10-year Japanese government bonds
(JGBs). In line with this understanding, Dr. Hetzel interprets the failure of a high 
level of CABs at the BOJ to stimulate money (M2+CDs) growth as a consequence of
policies that make the monetary base dependent on the demand for excess reserves by
banks, rather than on the behavior of a nominal variable such as money supply growth,
nominal output, or the price level. We believe that this is the essence of his policy 
proposal. Our comments and reservations with respect to this proposal are as follows.
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First, our experience to date suggests that while such policy decisions might 
potentially increase the size of the portfolios of economic agents, and might lead to 
a change in their portfolios and ultimately stimulate economic activity, the possibility
of such an influence remains uncertain, and its stimulating effect on economic 
activity would be quite modest, at best. Dr. Hetzel argues that the failure of a high
level of CABs to stimulate money (M2+CDs) growth is a consequence of policies
that make the monetary base dependent on the demand for excess reserves. 
In contrast to Dr. Hetzel’s argument, we would conclude that the current quantita-
tive easing conducted by the BOJ should be understood mainly as a device to signal
the future course of monetary policy. Indeed, recent BOJ monetary policy has been
characterized by a heavy reliance on the policy duration effect. Under quantitative
monetary easing, the BOJ commits to providing ample liquidity, easily exceeding 
the required reserve, until consumer price index (CPI) inflation stabilizes at or above
zero percent. 
However, our experience suggests that the link between the increase in the monetary
base and general price levels under the quantitative easing framework might not be 
as clear as many economists’ theoretical predictions before the introduction of such 
a framework.
8 In this context, we ought to try to gain a better understanding of the
transmission channels of the quantitative easing policy, based on data after 2001.
To examine the impact of policy changes on market expectations, we employ case
study analyses to detect the effect of changes in monetary policy in the short term,
following Okina and Shiratsuka (2004a). We focus on the short-term effects of four
increases in the target range of CABs beginning in the spring of 2003: April 30, 
May 20, and October 10, 2003, as well as January 20, 2004.
Figure 1 plots four indicators, PD, R(PD), SL, and LFR, for the period from 20
days before to 40 days following each policy event.
9 In each panel, a solid black line
shows the estimated parameters, while the solid gray lines show the upper and lower
boundaries of the respective confidence intervals, obtained by adding and subtracting
two times the standard errors of the estimated coefficients. The solid horizontal line
indicates estimates of each indicator on the date of the event. We can see little or no
evidence that policy changes produced any persistent impact on market expectations,
except for the event of May 20, 2003.
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8. For example, the increases in the target range of CABs on October 10, 2003 and January 20, 2004, which were
“apparently undertaken to emphasize the BOJ’s commitment to maintaining the policy of quantitative easing,” 
as Dr. Hetzel states in his paper. However, such increases seem to have had no significant impact on market 
expectations regarding the future course of the economy.
9. The four indicators, which are derived from the estimation results for instantaneous forward rate curves, extract
market expectations for the duration of the policy commitment as well as the flatness of the yield curve. PD, policy
duration, corresponds to the length of the flattened shape in the shorter end of the forward rate curve, thus 
capturing the market expectation as to the length of time the BOJ will continue to maintain a zero interest rate.
R(PD), the estimated spot rate at PD, shows the flatness of the forward rate curve at the shorter end, indicating
the confidence of market participants in the strength of the BOJ’s commitment to a zero interest rate. SL is the 
maximum slope of the forward rate curve in the second stage, upward-trending after PD, indicating market 
expectations as to how rapidly the economy will recover from zero interest rate conditions. LFR is the long-term
forward rate, and is viewed as a proxy for the sum of expected inflation and expected economic growth, or
expected nominal economic growth. See the Appendix for details of the indicators of policy duration effects.Figure 2 further plots four indicators over time since 1998, which includes the
periods of the above case studies. We see that the most significant changes in market
expectations since the spring of 2003 occurred in the summer between the second
and third cases in Figure 1. During this period, the forward rate curve shifts upward
in the medium to long term, as evidenced by increased SL and  LFR, indicating
brightening market expectations for the long-term performance of the economy. At
the same time, PD shortens, partly because such positive expectations in turn shorten
the expected duration of the policy commitment to a zero rate or to quantitative
monetary easing.
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[4] Monetary Policy Meeting on January 20, 2004: CAB Target ¥27–32 Trillion→ ¥30–35 Trillion30 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2004
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[4] Long-Term FR: LFRB. Cost-Benefit Comparison
Admittedly, Dr. Hetzel’s proposal to end deflation regardless of the magnitude of 
the needed expansion in the monetary base should have a strong effect on market
expectations. However, in the current Japanese situation, which Dr. Hetzel describes
in Footnote 1 of his paper, noting that real GDP grew steadily in 2002 and 2003 at a
rate of almost 3 percent, while the CPI remained basically stable in 2003, with a
falling unemployment rate, this kind of experiment ought to be compared closely
with other policy options in terms of feasibility and costs.
As for the costs, first we must address the significant issue of the decline in 
the functioning of financial markets, especially the money market. The more the
BOJ proceeds with a policy of monetary easing to secure stability in the financial
market, the more demand for current account deposits will increase due to the
impaired functioning of the market. As a result, the BOJ will have to meet this
demand for increased liquidity to stabilize the market. This is the dilemma the BOJ
currently faces.
10
In this context, it should be noted that the purchase of illiquid assets in an 
environment of zero interest rates necessarily leads to fiscal consequences. Estimates
of potential costs and benefits of this option are required to maintain accountability
to taxpayers. Taxpayers should be able to compare various unorthodox policy options
in terms of the societal consequences, which are not addressed in Dr. Hetzel’s paper.
11
C. Timing of Introduction of Explicit Nominal Anchor
Finally, as for the importance of a nominal anchor in monetary policy, Dr. Hetzel
makes an argument for price stability within his model of the quantity theory of
money. A simple model and a historical lesson drawn from the U.S. FRB in the
1970s provide us with a clear view of his position. We agree that the application of 
a nominal anchor to achieve price stability is, in theory and in practice, a very 
important element of monetary policy. 
That being said, we must be very careful in the current environment in Japan. 
In practice, the situation in Japan is much more complicated than Dr. Hetzel 
argues. For example, fluctuations in the GDP deflator (which Dr. Hetzel cites in his
paper) and in the CPI applied by many central banks (including the BOJ) display
characteristics unique to Japan (Figure 3), particularly since the mid-1990s.
More importantly, asset prices have continued to decline remarkably for a decade
after the bursting of the asset price bubble at the beginning of the 1990s, while 
consumer prices have remained almost constant (Figure 4). Stock prices plunged in
the early 1990s and have since followed a downward trend, albeit with continual ups
and downs. Land prices started declining with a two-year lag relative to stock prices,
and have since continued to decline at an annual rate of around 10 percent. Mild
deflation of less than 1 percent per annum, which naturally attracts public attention,
31
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10. See Fukui (2003).
11. In 2001, then Deputy Governor Yamaguchi argued, “The basic rule in a democratic society is that fiscal policy
using taxpayers’ money needs to be approved as part of a budget by a parliament composed of members elected
by the people. I am not worrying about inflation when deflation is a concern, but claiming that such a policy 
of purchasing various assets should be discussed publicly in the context of governance in a democratic society.”
See Yamaguchi (2002).32 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2004
Figure 3  CPI and GDP Deflator in Japan
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Figure 4  Asset Prices and General Prices in Japan












Note: CPI excluding fresh food is seasonally adjusted by X-12-ARIMA with options of 
(0 1 2)(0 1 1) ARIMA model and level shifts in April 1989 and April 1997, when
the consumption tax was introduced and subsequently increased, respectively.
Sources: Bank of Japan, “Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly”; Ministry of 
Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications,
“Consumer Price Index”; Japan Real Estate Institute, “Urban Land 
Price Index.”is deemed far less significant than asset price deflation. As a result, the relative price
system has dramatically changed in the context of extremely stable consumer prices
since the mid-1980s.
12 Raising the rate of inflation of general prices by several 
percentage points would not mean much in terms of asset prices. In fact, it is the
ratio between asset and general prices that must be adjusted, as Ueda (2004) argues. 
IV. Conclusion
We would like to conclude by emphasizing that we thoroughly enjoyed reading 
Dr. Hetzel’s paper, and that we and the staff of the BOJ gained a great deal from
lengthy discussions with him during his stay in Japan. We hope that we will have the
opportunity for further discussions and even greater agreement in the future.
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12. For details of the relative price change, see Okina and Shiratsuka (2004b).APPENDIX: INDICATORS FOR THE POLICY DURATION EFFECT
Okina and Shiratsuka (2004a) derive indicators for the policy duration effect using
the parameters of an extended version of Nelson and Siegel’s (1987) model, proposed
by Söderlind and Svensson (1997). 
The extended Nelson-Siegel model specifies the instantaneous forward rate (IFR)
for a settlement at period m, denoted by r(m), as
mm mmm r(m) =  0+ 1exp(–— –)+ 2(—– )exp(–— –)+  3(—– )exp(–— –),  1   1  1  2  2
(A.1)
where  0,  1,  2,  3,  1, and  2 are parameters to be estimated from the data. We
expect  0,  1, and  2 to be positive. 
To detect market expectations on the duration of the policy commitment as well
as the impact of the policy, Okina and Shiratsuka (2004a) define four indicators for
the policy duration effect, as shown below. First, policy duration, denoted by PD, is
defined as point  2, where r(m) becomes increasingly upward-trending in the second-
stage increase, typically at the year-to-settlement of one year or more. As mentioned
earlier, the fourth term on the right-hand side of equation (A.1) takes a minimum
value at this point. All downward factors are exhausted at this point, since  2 always
takes a larger value than  1. 
Second, the estimated spot rate at PD, R(PD), is regarded as a measure of market
confidence in the BOJ’s policy commitment to a zero interest rate.
13 This is because,
as shown in equation (A.2), R(PD) is equivalent to the lower area of the IFR curve
from zero to PD. That is,




In other words, R(PD) is the averaged IFR between zero and PD. A smaller R(PD)
implies that financial market participants expect a lower path of short-term interest
rates and have greater confidence in the BOJ’s commitment to zero interest rates. 
Third, the slope of r(m) at the inflection point is used as a proxy for the flatness
of the whole shape of the curve. Based on the definition of the inflection point, 
this is the maximum grade of r(m) in the second-stage increase. r(m) then gradually
converges to the long-term forward rate, given by  0. This slope is denoted as 
SL. Given that the inflection point approximately corresponds to 2 2 in our 
specifications, the slope at this point is 
SL = arctan(r′(2 2)). (A.3)
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13. As shown by Fujiki and Shiratsuka (2002), r(m) is also affected by the liquidity concerns of financial institutions,
especially at the time of large liquidity events, such as the Y2K problem and the introduction of the real-time
gross settlement system.Fourth,  0, which corresponds to the long-term forward rate, or LFR, is regarded
as a proxy for the sum of expected inflation and expected economic growth, or
expected nominal economic growth.
14 More precisely, the steady-state nominal 
interest rate i
* is equal to the sum of the steady-state real interest rate r
* and the
steady-state rate of inflation  
* by Fisher’s equation. Thus, LFR can be written as 
LFR = i
*+   = r
*+  
*+  , (A.4)
where   is a risk premium. This is deemed to reflect market expectations for long-term
economic performance.
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14. In examining the time-series movements of the long-term forward rate, we must be careful to account for the
possible effects of supply and demand in financial markets showing long-term maturity.36 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2004
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